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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Anthony DeCello appeals from a conviction for 
conspiring to commit mail fraud for the purpose of avoiding 
Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax.  In his appeal, DeCello raises four 
issues:  (1) that there is insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction; (2) that the evidence adduced at trial established a 
prejudicial variance with the conspiracy charged in the 
indictment; (3) that his prosecution for conspiring to commit 
mail fraud violates principles of federalism; and (4) that the 
district court erred when it admitted a copy of his 1992 tax 
return at trial. 
 Because we agree with DeCello that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, we need not 
address the remaining three issues.  For the reasons which 
follow, we will reverse DeCello's conviction. 
I. 
 DeCello was indicted along with six co-defendants for 
criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The 
conspiracy count alleged a single conspiracy with two objects: 
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(a) to defraud the United States regarding federal diesel fuel 
excise taxes, and (b) to use the United States mail in an effort 
to defraud the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with respect to the 
state's Fuel Use Tax, a tax imposed on the sale of diesel motor 
fuel. 
A.  Factual Background 
 The conspiracy involved a scheme in which wholesalers 
and retailers attempted to avoid paying federal and state taxes 
imposed on what is known as "number two" fuel oil.  Except for 
small variations in additives, "number two" fuel oil can be used 
as either home heating oil or diesel fuel.  If used as diesel 
fuel, it is subject to a Federal Excise Tax of 20.1 cents per 
gallon.  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposes an additional 
10.35 cents per gallon Oil Franchise Tax at the wholesale level, 
and an additional 12 cents per gallon Fuel Use Tax at the retail 
level.  In contrast, when used as home heating oil, "number two" 
fuel oil is not subject to any taxes. 
 The fuel taxes are collected and reported by the 
respective sellers in the chain of commerce.  Wholesale 
distributors of diesel fuel are required to collect the federal 
excise tax and the Commonwealth's Oil Franchise Tax, while 
retailers are required to pay a Highway Fuel Use Tax to the 
Commonwealth.  Retailers must also file monthly fuel use tax 
reports which include, among other information, the name of all 
diesel fuel wholesale suppliers and the amount of diesel fuel 
purchased from each supplier during each reporting period. 
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 Both federal and state law allow registered wholesale 
participants to buy and sell number two fuel oil in tax-free 
transactions.  For example, wholesalers of diesel fuel are 
required to register with the Internal Revenue Service for Form 
637 ("Registration For Tax Free Transactions").  This allows a 
registered wholesaler to sell diesel fuel to another registered 
wholesaler without paying the federal excise tax.  Retailers and 
unregistered wholesalers, on the other hand, are not authorized 
to obtain Form 637.  Consequently, any sale of diesel fuel to a 
retailer or to an unregistered wholesaler is subject to excise 
taxes. 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's excise tax law is 
subject to a similar registration system.  All retail sales of 
diesel fuel are subject to Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax. 
B.  The Scheme 
 The conspiracy in this case allegedly involved fuel 
wholesalers and retail truck stops attempting to escape the 
federal and state taxes imposed on diesel fuel.  According to the 
Government, the conspiracy accomplished this by having the 
wholesalers invoice deliveries of taxable diesel fuel as 
nontaxable sales of home heating oil.  The retailers who accepted 
delivery of this fuel paid in cash, kept the transactions off 
their official books, adjusted the oil meters, mingled the 
untaxed oil with oil that had been taxed and acquired from other 
wholesalers, and filed false tax returns.  In this way, both the 
wholesalers and retailers avoided paying their respective taxes. 
By avoiding these taxes, the wholesalers were able to undercut 
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the prices charged by legitimate wholesale competitors.  The 
retailers were then able to purchase diesel fuel at lower prices 
and keep the transactions entirely off their books. 
 This particular scheme was the brainchild of Leon 
Uzdin, who began his operations in the Philadelphia area, and 
expanded them westward to the Pittsburgh area.  According to the 
indictment, Anthony DeCello participated in Uzdin's operation in 
several ways:  first, by recruiting haulers to deliver the fuel 
to the participating truck stops; second, by picking up the 
payments from the truck stops; and third, by delivering the cash 
payments to the scheme's principals.  In return, according to the 
indictment, DeCello received a commission and expenses.  Finally, 
when Uzdin's relationship with a fuel supplier began to sour, 
DeCello helped recruit a new fuel source. 
 DeCello and Uzdin initially met with Terry Tyhonas, a 
hauler recruited by DeCello.  At that meeting, DeCello asked 
Tyhonas to furnish "[s]ome fuel with a paper and some fuel 
without a paper." (i.e., with and without tax).  After Tyhonas 
turned them down, DeCello found Ronald Schramm, president of Judy 
Oil Co.  Schramm agreed to furnish the fuel oil and invoice the 
sales to Main Line as home heating oil.  This relationship 
continued for almost a year, during which Judy Oil furnished 
Uzdin with approximately eight million gallons of diesel fuel. 
For his efforts in recruiting Schramm, DeCello was promised a 
commission of one cent per gallon. 
 All of the participants allegedly filed false tax 
returns during the scheme.  Judy Oil filed quarterly federal 
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excise tax returns which omitted all of the taxable sales that 
were occurring between Judy Oil and the various retailers 
involved in the scheme.  The retailers involved filed federal and 
state income tax reports which omitted untaxed deliveries and 
sales of diesel fuel.  In addition, DeCello filed a federal 
income tax return in 1992 in which he allegedly omitted payments 
and commissions obtained from Uzdin. 
 Five of DeCello's six co-defendants entered guilty 
pleas to the conspiracy charge.  DeCello and Schramm proceeded to 
trial.  The jury convicted DeCello on the conspiracy charge, and 
convicted Schramm on conspiracy and other charges.  Through 
special verdict forms, the jury concluded that Schramm conspired 
to defraud the United States and, as we will develop more fully 
below, that DeCello conspired to commit mail fraud.  DeCello's 
post-trial motions were denied and this appeal followed. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
 The principal issue before us is whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that DeCello 
entered into an agreement and knew that the agreement had the 
specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment, 
particularly, to evade and defeat Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax. 
United States v. Scanzello, 832 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir. 1987).  Our 
review of this issue is circumscribed by the fundamental 
principle that: 
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[i]t is not for [an appellate court] to weigh 
the evidence or to determine the credibility 
of witnesses.  The verdict of a jury must be 
sustained if there is substantial evidence, 
taking the view most favorable to the 
Government, to support it. 
United States v. Glass, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).  A verdict will 
only be overturned "if no reasonable juror could accept the 
conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Consequently, a "claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a 
heavy burden on an appellant."  United States v. McGlory, 968 
F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 
918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 Nonetheless, the government must prove each element of 
a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, and we have noted that 
"the sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution 
requires close scrutiny."  United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 
804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987).  There must be substantial evidence 
establishing "a `unity of purpose,' intent to achieve a common 
goal, and an agreement to work together toward that goal." 
McGlory, 968 F.2d at 321 (quoting United States v. Wexler, 838 
F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Although all of the elements of 
the government's case, including the existence of the agreement, 
may be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence, United 
States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986), "there must 
be evidence tending to prove that defendant entered into an 
agreement and knew that the agreement had the specific unlawful 
purpose charged in the indictment."  Scanzello, 832 F.2d at 20. 
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A.  The Indictment 
 The indictment charged DeCello and his co-defendants 
with a single conspiracy which sought to accomplish two purposes. 
One purpose, set forth in paragraph 18(a) of the indictment, was 
to: 
[d]efraud the United States Department of the 
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service, a 
department and agency of the United States, 
by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and 
defeating the lawful government functions of 
the Department of the Treasury and the 
Internal Revenue Service in the 
ascertainment, computation, assessment, and 
collection of the revenue; to wit, federal 
diesel fuel excise taxes. 
App. at 194 (emphasis added).  The second purpose, set forth in 
paragraph 18(b), was entirely different in that it involved a 
different underlying offense (mail fraud) and a completely 
different type of fuel tax.  Here, the grand jury charged that 
DeCello conspired to: 
[d]evise and execute a scheme and artifice to 
defraud, and to obtain money and property by 
means of false and fraudulent pretenses, 
representations and promises, furthered by 
the use of the United States mail, 
particularly, to evade and defeat the full 
payment of the Fuel Use Tax imposed on the 
sale of diesel motor fuel under the laws of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in violation 
of Title 18, United States Code, § 1341 (Mail 
Fraud). 
App. at 194-95 (emphasis added). 
 The court provided the jury with a special verdict form 
which permitted the jury, if they found DeCello guilty of 
conspiracy, to select paragraph 18(a) and/or paragraph 18(b) as 
the purpose and object of the conspiracy agreed to by DeCello. 
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The jury marked the purpose and object corresponding to 
paragraph 18(b), specifically that DeCello had agreed to "violate 
federal law, namely federal law prohibiting mail fraud." 
 DeCello argues that the evidence produced by the 
government was insufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction 
because at best, it established that he knowingly participated in 
a scheme to evade federal wholesale taxes, the subject of 
paragraph 18(a), but failed to establish that he knowingly 
entered into an agreement to use the United States mail to evade 
and defeat the full payment of Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax, which 
is the focus of paragraph 18(b).  We agree.  Our review of the 
record leads us to conclude that the government failed to present 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that DeCello 
ever agreed to participate in, or had any knowledge of, the 
retailers' evasion of Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax. 
B. 
 Specifically, there is simply no evidence to indicate 
that DeCello ever met or communicated with any of the truck stop 
owners; that he was even aware of, let alone sought to evade, the 
Pennsylvania Fuel Use Tax; or that any of DeCello's alleged co-
conspirators at the wholesale level were aware of, authorized, or 
participated in the evasion of diesel fuel retail taxes. 
 The government asks us to draw certain inferences from 
circumstantial evidence it relied upon to support the conclusion 
that DeCello had knowledge of the retailers' evasion of 
Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax. 
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 First, the government notes that Uzdin testified that 
he informed DeCello of his reasons for terminating a prior 
operation, and that DeCello was aware of the price the truck 
stops were paying for the oil.  Second, the government points out 
that DeCello assisted Uzdin in recruiting a new supplier of fuel, 
recruited haulers for the fuel, and handled payments collected 
from the various truck stops.  Consequently, the government 
suggests, that DeCello must have played an integral role in the 
conspiracy and should have had knowledge of the retailers' 
criminal actions.  Finally, the government argues that DeCello 
must have been aware of the retailers' tax evasion because the 
evasion of both retail and wholesale taxes was required to 
confound the so called "audit trail."  In other words, if either 
the retailers or wholesalers reported and paid their applicable 
taxes, they would expose the others' tax evasion because there 
would be inconsistencies between the wholesalers' and retailers' 
records. 
 These arguments, however, are insufficient to support 
the jury's verdict.  As the government concedes, DeCello "was a 
supply-sider throughout" the entire scheme.  (Appellee's Br. at 
28).  Although DeCello appears to have been an active participant 
in the wholesale aspects of Uzdin's operation, the only inference 
to be drawn from this evidence is that DeCello's participation 
might have made him aware of the suppliers' evasion of diesel 
fuel wholesale taxes.  We cannot overlook the fact that Uzdin's 
activities with his suppliers were limited to the wholesale side 
of the diesel fuel market.  Similarly, DeCello's effort to 
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recruit a new supplier of fuel oil "without a paper," or without 
Form 637, involved the avoidance of the Federal Excise Tax 
imposed at the wholesale level.  Moreover, Uzdin's testimony 
during the government's direct examination merely establishes 
that the suppliers were avoiding federal wholesale taxes: 
Q. And you would take your 637 form and you 
would present it or cause it to be 
presented to other buyers and sellers of 
fuel? 
 
A. To the seller, yes.  Supplier or 
terminal. 
 
Q. To the terminal that you were buying 
from? 
 
A. Yeah. 
 
Q. And by doing that you had no tax? 
 
A. Yeah.  We got product, we pay only state 
tax and whatever other tax besides 
federal tax. 
 
Q. You paid no federal tax? 
 
A. No. 
App. at 18 (emphasis added).  Uzdin never mentioned retail taxes 
in any of his testimony.  There is nothing to indicate that 
DeCello's participation with Uzdin gave him any knowledge of the 
retailers' subsequent criminal activities; quite to the contrary, 
it appears that the supply-siders' interest in the oil ended when 
the oil was sold and delivered to the truck stops.  The 
government produced no evidence to demonstrate that the suppliers 
were concerned with how the retailers subsequently treated and 
disposed of the oil. 
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 Similarly, DeCello's awareness of what the retailers 
were paying the suppliers for the fuel oil has no bearing on 
whether or not he knew that the retailers were avoiding their 
taxes.  Once again, at best this merely proves that he was or 
should have been aware of the suppliers' tax evasion.  Uzdin 
testified that he purchased the oil from his supplier at two and 
a half cents and up to four and a half cents per gallon over rack 
price ("rack price" is the price for which fuel is sold at the 
refiner's terminal), and that he charged the truck stops twelve 
cents over rack price.  This left Uzdin with a gross profit of 
approximately seven to nine cents per gallon.  From this, Uzdin 
ostensibly paid both DeCello and another alleged conspirator one 
cent per gallon, leaving him five to seven cents per gallon to 
pay approximately thirty cents in state and federal wholesale 
taxes, cover other expenses, and derive some profit.  Because 
Uzdin testified that he discussed these matters with DeCello, one 
could infer that DeCello knew or should have known that Uzdin was 
evading the wholesale taxes.  Otherwise, Uzdin would be losing 
approximately twenty-three cents per gallon.  This, however, is 
not enough to allow a reasonable juror to infer that DeCello knew 
that the retailers were then evading their taxes as well.  Even 
if the evidence demonstrated that DeCello not only knew the price 
the retailers were paying for the fuel oil but also the price 
they charged the public, that knowledge would still be 
insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that DeCello 
knew the retailers were not paying their taxes.  At best, this 
evidence might allow a reasonable juror to conclude that DeCello 
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knew that the retailers were profiting by buying fuel oil at 
below market rates. 
 Finally, as to the government's argument that the 
evasion of one set of taxes necessarily requires the evasion of 
all diesel fuel taxes, we believe that this ignores the fact that 
there were other ways for retailers to evade their taxes without 
the cooperation of the suppliers.  For example, the retailers 
could simply have falsified their monthly and annual reports by 
misrepresenting the amount of diesel fuel received regardless of 
the wholesale source; or the truck stops could have 
misrepresented the amount of diesel fuel sold.  Neither of these 
methods would have required the participation of wholesalers.  No 
doubt, the retailers' efforts were facilitated and their profits 
increased by the suppliers' illegal activities in this case, but 
that does not lead to the conclusion that the suppliers were 
aware of, let alone agreed to participate in, the retailer's 
effort to avoid the applicable retail tax. 
 We, therefore, cannot conclude that the evidence 
adduced at trial allows a "reasonable inference, that the 
activities of the participants . . . could not have been carried 
on except as the result of a preconceived scheme or common 
understanding."  Kapp, 781 F.2d at 1010.  Upon our independent 
review of the record, we must conclude that the government 
provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that DeCello knew 
or should have know that the retailers intended to evade their 
taxes.  Although DeCello's actions may have aided the retailers 
in their tax evasion, we have repeatedly held that to sustain a 
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conspiracy conviction, the government must establish that a 
defendant had knowledge of the specific illegal object of the 
conspiracy.  See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 
1114-16 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing the conviction of a defendant 
who aided in the sale of a wrapped package, but had no knowledge 
of the contents); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 91-92 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant's participation as a lookout 
and assisting in the movement of a truck that contained a large 
quantity of hashish was insufficient to sustain a conviction for 
conspiring to distribute hashish in the absence of any evidence 
that the defendant knew what was in the truck); United States v. 
Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing the 
conspiracy conviction of a defendant who travelled cross-country 
with a co-defendant in a truck carrying marijuana because there 
was no evidence that the defendant knew what was in the locked 
compartment of the truck); United States v. Veksler, 862 F. Supp. 
1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (acquitting a participant in the sale 
of untaxed diesel fuel to truck stops even though the evidence 
showed that the defendant knew that the truck stop oil sales he 
facilitated were illegal because there was no evidence to 
demonstrate that the defendant was aware that he was working in 
aid of a larger conspiracy and its objectives), aff'd 62 F.3d 544 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
C. 
 The district court upheld the jury's verdict based upon 
a different theory.  According to the district court, the jury 
convicted DeCello for participating in a single unified 
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conspiracy to sell "Number 2 fuel oil for taxable purposes under 
the guise of selling Number 2 fuel oil for non-taxable purposes," 
and there was sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. 
United States v. Schramm, No. 93-188, slip op. at 16 (W.D. Pa. 
Aug. 16, 1994).  To reach this result, however, the district 
court implicitly interpreted paragraph 18(b)'s reference to 
Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax as illustrative rather than 
exclusive.  Under the district court's interpretation, the 
conspiracy charge in paragraph 18(b) necessarily includes 
evasions of Pennsylvania's Fuel Oil Franchise Tax imposed at the 
wholesale level.  Consequently, the district court was able to 
affirm DeCello's conviction based upon his participation in and 
awareness of the fuel oil suppliers' evasion of their applicable 
wholesale taxes.  Under any other interpretation of the 
indictment, the district court's conclusion would run afoul of 
the rule that the evidence must establish that the defendant 
entered into an agreement and "knew that the agreement had the 
specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictment."  Scanzello, 
832 F.2d at 20 (emphasis added).  But even if we were to agree 
that the evidence supported the conclusion that DeCello agreed to 
participate in a scheme which had the purpose of evading 
Pennsylvania's Oil Franchise Tax, we would not agree with the 
district court's interpretation of the indictment, and must, 
therefore, reverse DeCello's conviction. 
 While an indictment must generally be taken as a whole, 
read reasonably and given fair construction, United States v. 
Markus, 721 F.2d 442, 443-44 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. 
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King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that appellate 
courts "should read an indictment in a common sense manner, [and] 
refus[e] to reverse a conviction because of minor deficiencies in 
the indictment that could not have prejudiced the defendant 
. . ."), "[t]he precise manner in which an indictment is drawn 
cannot be ignored . . . ."  Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 
54, 65-66 (1978) (emphasis added).  The principle that an 
indictment must contain the essential elements of the offense 
charged is premised upon three distinct constitutional commands 
which we cannot ignore.  First, the indictment must be 
sufficiently precise to inform the defendant of the charges 
against which he or she must defend, as required by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Second, the indictment must enable an individual to 
determine whether he or she may plead a prior acquittal or 
conviction to bar future prosecutions for the same offense, in 
accordance with the Fifth Amendment.  Id.; Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Hagner v. United States, 285 
U.S. 427, 431 (1932).  To accomplish these goals, an indictment 
must specifically set forth the essential elements of the offense 
charged.  Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117.  See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7(c)(1) ("The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and 
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting 
the offense charged.").  Third, the: 
purpose of an indictment is to shield a 
defendant in a federal felony case from 
unfounded prosecutorial charges and to 
require him to defend in court only those 
allegations returned by an independent grand 
jury, as provided by the Fifth 
Amendment. . . .  By sufficiently 
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articulating the critical elements of the 
underlying offense, an indictment insures 
that the accused has been duly charged by the 
grand jury upon a proper finding of probable 
cause, and will be convicted only on the 
basis of facts found by that body. 
United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 466 (D. Del. 1980) 
(citing United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526, 528-29 (3d Cir. 
1974)). 
 In cases which involve a conspiracy charge, the illegal 
object of the conspiracy is an essential element of the offense 
and must be included in the indictment.  See United States v. 
Shaffer, 383 F. Supp 339, 342 (D. Del. 1974). 
 As discussed earlier, Count I of the indictment, which 
charges a conspiracy, sets forth two purposes.  The jury 
convicted DeCello of agreeing to accomplish the second purpose. 
The second purpose, which was set forth in paragraph 18(b), was 
to devise and execute a scheme and artifice to defraud by the use 
of the United States mail, "particularly, to evade and defeat the 
full payment of the Fuel Use Tax imposed on the sale of diesel 
motor fuel under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
. . ."  App. at 194-95 (emphasis added).  To accept the district 
court's conclusion, we would be required to interpret 
"particularly" as used in paragraph 18(b) to mean "for example" 
or "as one example among others," and to assume that the "other" 
charges to which the word "particularly" refers included the 
evasion of taxes not set forth in the paragraph itself.  But the 
word "particularly," as it appears in paragraph 18(b), is 
synonymous with "to-wit," a term commonly used in indictments to 
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refer to a discrete event.  Likewise, "particularly" as used here 
is synonymous with the more conventional "specifically," which, 
in fact, is used in paragraph 18(a) of the indictment.  See 
Merriam Webster, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 858 
(1985).  Both terms ("specifically" and "particularly") are used 
to set forth detailed descriptions of the conspiracy's goals; 
they are exclusive, not inclusive.  If the government had 
intended to charge DeCello with agreeing to participate in a 
scheme to violate Pennsylvania's wholesale tax as well, it easily 
could have, and certainly should have, done so. 
 While courts must ignore minor and technical 
deficiencies in an indictment, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 
749, 763 (1962) ("Convictions are no longer reversed because of 
minor and technical deficiencies which did not prejudice the 
accused."); Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) 
(holding that courts must "disregarded merely loose or 
inartificial forms of averment."), an indictment's failure to 
specify the object of a conspiratorial agreement cannot be 
considered a minor or technical deficiency which can be ignored. 
As we have said, "[t]he essence of a conspiracy is an agreement." 
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989).  The 
goal or goals of the agreement are, therefore, essential elements 
of the crime of conspiracy itself.  An omission such as occurred 
here deprives the defendant of one of the significant protections 
which the guaranty of a grand jury indictment is intended to 
confer.  By not specifying the evasion of the federal excise tax 
or of Pennsylvania's wholesale fuel tax as one of the goals of 
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the conspiracy in paragraph 18(b), the indictment failed to 
apprise DeCello "with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the 
accusations against him."  Russell, 369 U.S. at 766 (quoting 
United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1877)).  To adopt the 
district court's interpretation of the indictment would be to 
allow DeCello's "conviction to rest on one point and the 
affirmance of the conviction to rest on another," giving "the 
prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by 
surmise or conjecture."  Russell, 369 U.S. at 766.  This we 
cannot do. 
 Paragraph 18(b) of the indictment alleges only that 
DeCello agreed to use the United States mails to evade 
Pennsylvania's Fuel Use Tax.  It does not allege an agreement to 
evade any wholesale level taxes, and we cannot interpret 
paragraph 18(b) of the indictment as implicitly including the 
evasion of such taxes as additional goals of the conspiracy. 
III. 
  Because the government failed to produce 
sufficient evidence at trial to convince the jury to convict 
DeCello under paragraph 18(a) of the indictment and because the 
government further failed to prove that DeCello entered into an 
agreement and knew that the agreement had the specific unlawful 
purpose charged in paragraph 18(b) of the indictment, we will 
reverse DeCello's conviction and direct the entry of a judgment 
of acquittal. 
_________________________ 
 
